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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1328
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0252
CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001054

BT

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR M
DEPT FOR DS/CC
DEPT FOR DS/IP/AF
DEPT FOR S/S-O
DEPT FOR AF/EX
DEPT FOR AF/SPG
DEPT FOR CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [ASEC](#) [AEMR](#) [AMGT](#) [APER](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: SUDAN EAC AND UPDATED TRIPWIRES

11. (SBU) Embassy Khartoum's Emergency Action Committee convened on July 13 to review post operations, tripwires, and security considerations for Monday, July 14, when the ICC intends to announce indictments against Government of Sudan officials. In attendance were the CDA, A/DCM, RSO, MGT, CONS, USAID, RAO, DLO, and PAO.

12. (SBU) The EAC recommended that the Embassy be closed to the public and only staffed on July 14 with the following Mission-critical personnel: CDA, A/DCM, RSO, 2 ARSOs, DLO, AND MO. Only two Americans will be at the USAID compound. RAO will be fully staffed. LES staff will be limited to the RSO senior FSN staff, guard force, motorpool, telephone operator, and on-call facilities maintenance personnel.

13. (SBU) The EAC endorsed ICC indictment-specific tripwires that would trigger EAC urgent consideration of an Embassy drawdown:

- Violent demonstrations against Western embassies or UN facilities in Khartoum.

- Renewed Darfur rebel attacks on sites in the Nile Valley (such as Omdurman, Merowe Dam or Dongola) or the fall of any state capitals to Darfur rebels.

- A change in GOS attitude and behavior towards the US Embassy, to include but not limited to verbal or media incitement, lack of high-level access, massive denial of visas for staff, NEC stoppage, or ending of cooperation with NISS.

- Technical constraints affecting Embassy safety and administration, such as the crashing of the cellphone network in Khartoum over an abnormally long period, a "blue flu" walk-out by diplomatic police, or airport/airline disruption.

14. (SBU) Generally, actions to be considered should be the same as those identified in Post's tripwires for intra-state fighting:

- EAC convenes and documents meeting with front channel cable.

- Request authority for Authorized Departure for eligible family members and non-emergency personnel in accordance with 12 FAH-1

- Reduce embassy staffing to Level 2 (Reduced Staffing with minimal LES), both FSN and American.

- Request Department Task Force be considered, establish regular EAC meetings or form Task Force at post and start sending Situation Reports. Establish a rotational watch and reporting officer schedule on eight hour shifts.

- Increase communications with appropriate U.S. military combatant command by establishing an opening and closing of business conference call with State Ops, DS Command Center, and the appropriate combatant command.
- Inform AmCits through a warden notice of possibility that American Citizen Services may be terminated or curtailed.
- Review "stand-fast" plans together with review of off-chancery operations in light of current and possibly reduced personnel.
- Review transportation security to include consolidating agency motorpools to gain command and control of all armored vehicle assets and to better account for all movement.
- Update and reissue Travel Warning.
- Evaluate need for enhanced consular operations, such as off-site consular presence at airport, additional public announcements, additional personnel to field questions, or maintaining sufficient LES personnel (including drivers) to assist and process Amcit evacuees.
- Consular officer conducts meeting with EmbOffs who have completed ConGen training and have served previously as ConOffs to review ACS assistance strategy and coordinate Consular duties. Request Consular fly-away team if needed and able to obtain Sudanese visas.
- At Front Office level, meet with Sudanese officials and contacts to notify them of probable US intentions.
- Reduce controlled and classified documents to less than one-hour destruction time and review flash destruction procedures. Identify appropriately cleared destruction officer teams to assist IRM if needed.
- Review local healthcare resources, actual health risk, medical evacuation options, and public health and sanitation situation.
- Consult with M/FLO for services to evacuated personnel.
- Coordinate media message and timing of public announcement with Public Affairs.

15. (SBU) Embassy Khartoum's complete list of tripwires has been sent via e-mail to S/ES-O/CMS and AF PDAS Thomas-Greenfield.

FERNANDEZ